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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
INFANT ANONYMOUS• Case No. 87-0415CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2) (g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County rendered by the Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat in which Judge Moffat ruled that the consent to 
the adoption of the infant anonymous was not given freely and 
unconditionally by the natural mother and consequently allowed 
he revocation of consent for adoption and dismissed Appellants' 
petition for adoption. 
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ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
1. Does the setting aside of a consent for adoption by one 
judge constitute a reversal of the judge or commissioner (as 
allowed by Section 78-30-8 Utah Code Annotated) who took the 
original consent. 
2. When the issue of which judge is to preside is raised 
and neither party expresses any objection to Judge Moffat and 
both parties participate in arguing the motion and no objection 
is made until after a judgment is rendered, have the parties 
waived their right to object. 
3. Is it appropriate for the Trial Court to grant a 
revocation of consent for adoption when it is apparant from the 
facts that the consent was not given freely, voluntarily and 
unconditionally and when the mother was acting under a mistaken 
belief as to the finality of the consent. 
4. Is it necessary to have an evidentiary hearing on a 
motion to set aside a consent for adoption or is an evidentiary 
hearing something which can be wavied. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-8 (1987): 
Procedure - Agreement of adopting parents. The person 
adopting a child and the child adopted, and the other 
persons whose consent is necessary, must appear before 
the district court of the county where the person 
adopting resides, and the necessary consent must 
thereupon be signed and an agreement be executed by 
the person adopting to the effect that the child shall 
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be adopted and treated in all respects as his own 
lawful child; provided, that if a person whose consent 
is necessary is not within the county the court may, 
in the same manner as is or may be provided for the 
taking of depositions in civil cases, appoint a 
commissioner to examine such person upon his 
deposition and to take his written consent and to 
certify the same to the court. The commissioner shall 
explain to such person the legal significance of such 
consent, and shall certify to the court his findings 
as to whether or not the consent is freely given. 
Where such person is within the state of Utah the 
commission shall issue to a judge of the district 
court of the county in which such person is located. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The natural mother at the time she gave birth to the infant 
anonymous, was 21 years of age. This was her first pregnancy 
and at the time she was living at home and working off and on. 
(Addendum "AM at page 2) Throughout the pregnancy, the natural 
mother was able to conceal the fact that she was pregnant and in 
fact the pregnancy was a mystery even to Respondent's mother. 
(Addendum "A" at page 2.) 
Prior to the birth of the child, the natural mother spoke to 
some persons but the only real contact with any adoption agency 
was approximately June 1, 1987. (Addendum "A" at page 2. ) On 
June 23, 1987, the infant anonymous was born. (R. 116 Addendum 
"B" at page 2.) At that time, since persons in the natural 
mother's household were not aware of the pregnancy nor the birth 
of the child, the natural mother had a chance to place the child 
for adoption and avoid any embarrassment or conflict with her 
immediate family and, in fact, inquired into the possibility of 
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adoption. (Addendum "A" at page 3.) 
Between June 5 and the time the consent was taken, on only 
one occasion did the natural mother and the other persons 
involved meet to discuss the adoption. (Addendum "A" at Page 3.) 
The child was born on June 23, 1987, a Tuesday, at 
approximately 4:19 a.m. (R. 116 Addendum "BIf at page 2.) On 
Wednesday, June 24, 1987, the natural mothei: was before the Court 
at which time the issues of consent were addressed. After an 
extensive period of labor and the birth of Respondent's child, 
the Respondent, within 30 hours executed the consent for 
adoption. (R. 43 Addendum "C" at paragraph 15. ) At the time 
Respondent signed the consent, she was on pain medication and 
prior to the time she went to Court, she had significant doubts 
about giving the child up for adoption. (See paragraph 3 of 
Affidavit of Respondent.) Subsequent to the signing of the 
consent, Respondent acknowledged that she felt the pain 
medication together with the stress of child birth had left her 
without sufficient will and strength to properly evaluate the 
matter. (R. 22; Addendum "D" paragraph 3.) 
As soon as Respondent left the hospital and regained her 
strength and was able to rationally consider the matter, she 
realized that she did not want to lose her child and wanted to 
raise the child. (R. 22; Addendum "D" paragraph 4.) 
In addition to the medication and stress, Respondent was 
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informed and believed that the Decree of Adoption did not become 
final for six months after signing the consent and that she had 
the six month period of time in which she could change her mind. 
She did not realize nor understand that the giving of her consent 
and the signing of the affidavit would conclude the matter but 
rather was under the belief that she had six months before the 
adoption became final and that any time prior to the finality of 
the adoption she could change her mind. (R. 22; Addendum D 
paragraph 6.) 
Based upon Respondent? s resolve to take whatever measures 
were necessary to regain her child, Respondent, within two days 
informed her councilor, Susan Bagley, that she wanted the child 
and in fact retained an attorney and as soon as sufficient monies 
could be raised moved to set aside the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Consent. The Motion and Memorandum were 
timely and promptly filed with the Court on the 22nd day of July 
1987. (R. 11; Addendum "E".) 
In short, the baby was born early in the morning on Tuesday, 
June 23, 1987. On June 24, 1987, which was a Wednesday, the 
natural mother was before the Court on the issues of adoption. 
On Saturday, June 27, 1987, the natural mother called Susan 
Bagley, the counselor who was assisting in the adoption and 
informed her at that time that she wanted the child back and 
would not consent to the adoption. (Addendum "A" at page 3.) 
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After the natural mother had given birth and had appeared 
before the Court, she finally spoke to her family with regard to 
her circumstances and after she had seen the reaction of her 
family in that they were supportive and willing to stand by her 
at that time, the natural mother realized the circumstances and 
promptly notified Susan Bagley of her intentions. (Addendum "A" 
at page 5. ) 
The Respondent's Motion came on for hearing on August 31, 
1987, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat- At the time of 
the hearing, Judge Moffat was particularly concerned with two 
aspects of the case. First, Judge Moffat addressed the issue of 
whether Judge Murphy, the judge who originally took the consent, 
should be the judge who presided over the proceedings. At the 
time of the hearing, both parties argued their position and when 
confronted with the question of who should hear the matter, 
neither party objected to Judge Moffat hearing the arguments in 
lieu of the circumstances and, consequently, waived their rights 
at that time to have the matter heard by Judge Murphy. (R. 87-
88; Addendum "F".) The Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F" 
specifically states that the parties had waived their rights to 
have Judge Murphy hear the matter based upon the waiver and 
agreement of the parties and, consequently, Judge Moffat rendered 
his decision. (R. 87-88; Addendum "F" .) 
The second matter of concern to Judge Moffat was whether an 
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evidentiary hearing was necessary. Again, counsel for both 
parties argued their substantive positions at the August 31, 
1987, hearing and made no objection to having the evidence 
presented by proffer of counsel and, consequently, waived their 
right to have a full blown evidentiary hearing. The Court, 
having considered the matter, also stated in the Minute Entry 
attached as Addendum "F" that the parties having made no 
objection, had waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing. 
(R. 87-88; Addendum "F".) 
Based upon the proffered evidence by way of oral argument 
and affidavit, Judge Moffat found that Respondent did not freely 
and voluntarily give an unconditional release of her parental 
rights and, therefore, ordered that the child be returned 
forthwith to her natural mother. (R.57; Addendum ffGff.) 
Pursuant to the Minute Entry, attached as Addendum "G", the 
Court recognized that whatever decision it made was going to be 
emotionally disturbing to one or the other party. (R.57; 
Addendum "G".) However, the Court was convinced from the reading 
of the transcript of the proceedings, that the consent was not 
unconditional and in fact implied that her consent was not final 
and that the proceedings would have to "go forward." (R. 57; 
Addendum "G".) As an additional basis for the Court's ruling, 
the Court determined that the natural mother was not clearly 
apprised of the finality of signing the consent and specifically, 
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the Court found that the natural mother was confused and indeed 
believed that even though she signed the consent she would still 
have six months during which time the Decree of Adoption would 
not become final and that any time during that six month period 
she could withdraw her consent. (Addendum "H".) 
The Court was further impressed that the natural mother had 
not consulted members of her family until after the birth of the 
child and in fact advised the counselor that she wanted the child 
back within days of the signing of the consent. (R. 57; Addendum 
V . ) 
On September 4, 1987, counsel for Petitioners filed a 
Protective Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Amendment 
from Judgment or Relief from Judgment on th€* basis that the Court 
had allegedly errored in setting aside the consent given in front 
of and accepted by another District Judge and failing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing. (R. 66-68.) 
Petitioners' Motion was heard by Judge Moffat on September 
23, 1987. For a second time, Judge Moffat heard argument and 
ruled that the consent was not voluntarily given, that the 
parties had waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing, and 
the parties had waived their right to have Judge Murphy hear the 
matter. (R. 87-88; Addendum "F".) 
Petitioners requested Judge Moffat to stay his Order pending 
appeal. (R. 64.) Judge Moffat denied Petitioners' Motion and on 
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September 5, 1987, Petitioners, without involving counsel for the 
Respondent, obtained from this Court an Ex Parte Order staying 
Execution of the District Court decision. (Addendum "I".) 
At no time prior to the signing of the Stay of Execution nor 
subsequent thereto has a hearing been held on the Order Staying 
Execution. 
On February 5, 1988, pursuant to a Motion by the Petitioners 
to vacate Ruling, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, and 
Order and Judgment, a hearing was held again before Judge Moffat 
and for a third time the issues were presented to Judge Moffat 
and although minor changes were made to the wording of the Order, 
(Addendum "H") Judge Moffat upheld his prior rulings and again 
held that the prior proceedings were appropriate, that the 
consent be set aside and that the adoptive parents forthwith 
return the minor child to the natural mother. (Addendum "H".) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
A party's failure to object to Judge Moffat hearing the 
matter prior to the rendering of his decision constitutes a 
waiver of the right to later object to his ruling. The first 
hearing set on August 31, 1987, pursuant to Respondent's Motion 
to Set Aside the Consent, Judge Moffat specifically addressed the 
issue of whether he should hear the case and counsel for both 
Appellants and Respondent made no objection to Judge Moffat 
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hearing the matter and in fact both parties argued the matter at 
that time. Consequently, the Appellants have waived their right 
to have the matter retried before Judge Murphy solely because 
they are not pleased with the outcome. 
POINT II 
Also, at the initial hearing on August 31, 1987, neither 
party raised the issue nor requested an evidentiary hearing. Both 
the Respondent and Appellants made no objection to arguing the 
motion as opposed to calling in witnesses and,- proffered the 
testimony which would otherwise be given. At that point, the 
parties waived their right to an evidentiary hearing. 
Once the affidavits and oral argument were presented to 
Judge Moffat then Judge Moffat had the responsibility of making a 
decision based upon the arguments and affidavits as well as to 
assess the credibility of the affidavits and evidence and to make 
a decision based thereon. 
POINT III 
In order for the ruling of Judge Moffat to constitute a 
reversal, it would be necessary for Judge Murphy to have 
previously ruled in an adversarial proceeding as to whether the 
original consent should or should not have been set aside. The 
fact of the matter is that Judge Murphy never addressed the issue 
of whether it was appropriate to set aside the consent nor did 
Judge Murphy ever make a ruling as to whether the circumstances 
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warranted a setting aside of the natural mother's consent. 
Judge Moffat's Ruling setting aside the consent was a matter 
which was heard for the first time by Judge Moffat who is the 
only judge who has ruled on the matter and in no way constitutes 




THE PARTIES ARE BOUND WHEN COUNSEL WAIVES CERTAIN RIGHTS 
AND CONSEQUENTLY, APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO 
JUDGE MOFFAT HEARING THE MATTER PRECLUDES APPELLANTS 
FROM NOW ASSERTING THAT JUDGE MOFFAT INAPPROPRIATELY 
RULED ON THE MATTER 
Throughout Appellants' argument to Point I, they 
appropriately set out that a party who is not satisfied with a 
ruling of a Judge should be precluded from presenting the issue 
to a co-equal judge or, to forum shop until a favorable forum is 
found. In addition, Appellants correctly assert that one co-
equal court can not over-rule another co-equal court. Respondent 
makes no argument and, in fact, agrees that those are correct 
principles of law. However, frankly, those principles of law do 
not support Appellants' position. 
For some reason, Appellants have resolved that the natural 
mother in bringing her Petition before Judge Moffat was forum 
shopping or looking for some advantage in having the matter 
heard before Judge Moffat as opposed to Judge Murphy. In fact, 
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Appellants assert: 
At minimum, Respondent should be asked to face the 
judge to whom she initially testified and convince 
that judge that he errored when he accepted her 
initial testimony as true and released the child to 
the Petitioners. (See page 17 and 18, Appellants' 
Brief.) 
The allegations that the natural mother preferred one judge 
as opposed to another is ill founded and completely ignores the 
critical periods of time relative to which judge should hear the 
matter. At the time the natural mother filed her motion in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, there 
was no reason for the natural mother to believe that the case 
would be assigned to Judge Moffat as opposed to any other Third 
District Judge. In fact, at that time, the natural inclination 
would be that the matter would be assigned to Judge Murphy as 
opposed to some other judge. The assignment of the matter to one 
judge as opposed to another was a decision, which was made wholly 
by third parties for which the natural mother had no control or 
input. The allegations by Appellants that Judge Murphy should 
have heard the matter as opposed to Judge Moffat was a decision 
which was made by persons completely unattached to these 
proceedings. When Appellants assert in their brief that: 
It is not uncommon that the parties on both sides of 
an issue are not wholly satisfied with the ruling of a 
judge. Are they then allowed to present the issue to 
another co-equal judge so long as neither party 
expressed a desire to have the first judge hear the 
issue again? If so, the policy behind the rule would 
be effectively undermined. (See Appellants1 Brief 
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page 18.) 
It is difficult to understand how the argument cited supra 
by Appellants can support their position. Certainly at the time 
the natural mother filed her motion in the Third District, the 
natural assumption would be that Judge Murphy would be the judge 
assigned to hear the motion. 
At the time the matter was set for hearing, a notice was 
given that the motion would be heard before Judge Moffat as 
opposed to Judge Murphy. Appellants made no objection at that 
time as to the forum or the judge who would preside. At the time 
both parties actually came before Judge Moffat to present 
argument on the motion, Appellants made no objection to Judge 
Moffat presiding. In fact, as can be seen in the transcript 
attached as Exhibit "A" , there was no indication any where in 
the proceedings that Appellants had any feelings one way or the 
other which judge heard the matter. At the time oral argument 
was heard before Judge Moffat, the natural mother had no reason 
to believe that Judge Moffat's Court would be any more or less 
favorable to her position than Judge Murphy's Court. In short, 
at the time oral argument was heard on the natural mother's 
petition, the natural mother had no preference as to the forum 
and it appears that counsel for Appellants had no preference as 
to the forum because no objection was made. At no time prior to 
the time Judge Moffat rendered his decision did the natural 
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mother have a preference of forum and had Appellants objected to 
Judge Moffat presiding, the natural mother would not have 
resisted the motion being reassigned to Judge Murphy. 
It is only after a decision has been rendered adjudicating 
the rights of the respective parties that the natural mother has 
an objection to a change in forum. The fact of the matter that 
Appellants have remained silent until after a decision has been 
rendered and only then complains as to the forum, is prejudicial 
and unfair to the natural mother. 
When Appellants speak in their brief of sound policy 
considerations and the need for efficient consistent 
administration of a case, it would be entirely improper to allow 
Appellants to set back and wait for a decision to be rendered on 
the merits and only after realizing an adverse decision to be 
able to claim that Judge Moffat should not have heard the matter. 
Appellants' argument in Point I of their brief also sets out 
at length that the natural mother directly attacked Judge 
Murphy's finding that her consent had been knowingly and 
voluntarily given and that her affidavit supporting her motion to 
set aside the consent contradicted the testimony which she gave 
Judge Murphy at the time the consent was originally taken. (See 
page 16 and 17 of Appellants' Brief.) Certainly, Respondent 
would not agree with the characterization set out by Appellants 
but the point is that Judge Moffat had a complete copy of the 
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transcript setting out verbatim the questions which were asked 
and answered at the time the original consent was offered to 
Judge Murphy, In essence, Judge Moffat read every word that was 
spoken in the proceedings in which the consent was obtained and, 
therefore, was fully aware of what went on before Judge Murphy 
and was fully apprised of those facts when he rendered his 
decision. There is no reason to believe that Judge Murphy would 
have ruled any differently than Judge Moffat had ruled had the 
matter been decided before him. Consequently, after a decision 
has been rendered by Judge Moffat, being fully apprised of the 
facts, to have the matter reheard before Judge Murphy would only 
mean that Appellants would have a second shot of obtaining a 
favorable decision, the very thing they claim and cite 
authorities for as being inappropriate. Consequently, when 
Appellants state: 
Justice is not served by allowing Respondent to 
rescind the testimony given before one judge by 
submitting contradictory testimony to another judge. 
(See page 17 of Appellants1 Brief.) 
Appellants ignore the fact that Judge Moffat had the benefit of 
the transcript from the original consent proceedings and was 
fully aware of what went on at the time the consent was given. 
There is no question that the issue of whether Judge Moffat 
should decide the matter was raised and contemplated by the 
parties and the Court and that counsel for both parties agreed to 
allow Judge Moffat to preside over the matter. Judge Moffat's 
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Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F" states: 
The reason for said denial is that while the matter 
should perhaps have initially been heard by the judge 
that took the consent, this Court discussed that 
matter with counsel for the parties at the time of the 
initial hearing herein and neither party expressed a 
desire to have the judge who took the consent hear 
the matter. In addition, the matter was submitted on 
affidavits and oral argument, without any request for 
entry of additional evidence. It is the Court's 
opinion that had the parties asked either to have the 
original judge hear the matter or have an evidentiary 
hearing, both of said motions would have been granted. 
However, having not done so, this Court is of the 
opinion that those matters have been waived. 
A majority of the adjacent jurisdictions have also held that 
when a party participates in proceedings which are substantive 
and makes no objection to a particular judge presiding that a 
party's right to object to the judge presiding is waived. The 
Supreme Court of Alaska has stated as follows: 
We conclude that Sebring waived his right to a 
peremptory challenge once Judge Carlson presided over 
the first trial. Civil Rule 42(c)(4)(i) provides that 
a party waives the right to challenge a particular 
judge when s/he knowingly participates in any judicial 
proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and 
involves the consideration of evidence or of 
affidavits . . . 
Sebring vs. Colver 649 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1982). See also 
State Ex Rel Welfare Division vs. Eighth Judicial District Court 
462 P.2d 37 (Nevada 1969). 
The Washington Court of Appeals has held: 
One who claims a judge trying claimant's case is 
biased may waive his right to complain thereof by not 
timely raising the objection and proceeding with trial 
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or continuing with the pending trial as if the judge 
were not disqualified. This rule is applicable when 
disqualification of the judge is sought under RCW 
4.12.040 and 2.28.030. (Citations omitted.) We see 
no reason for not applying a like rule when the 
disqualification claim is based on due process 
grounds. Even a due process right may be waived. See 
In Re Borchert 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961). 
Were the rule otherwise a litigant, notwithstanding 
his knowledge of the disqualifying factor, could 
speculate on the successful outcome of the case and 
then, having put the Court, counsel and the parties to 
the trouble and expense of the trial, treat any 
judgment entered as subject to successful attack. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Brauhn vs. Brauhn 518 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wash. 1974.) 
Apppellants cite several cases for the proposition that co-
equal judges cannot over-rule or reverse another co-equal judge. 
The Federal Court of Appeals of Florida in Atlantic 
Coastline R. Co. vs. St. Joe Paper Co. 216 F.2d 832, 833 
(C.A.Fla.) defined a reversal as follows: 
To reverse a judgment means to overthrow it by 
contrary decision, make it void, undue or annul it 
forever. 
The critical question, therefore, is whether the taking of a 
consent constitutes a judgment for which a motion to set aside 
the consent would act as a reversal. 
Frankly speaking, the issue as to whether or not the consent 
should be set aside in the above-entitled case has only been 
addressed by one judge, Judge Moffat. The issue of whether it 
was appropriate to set aside the consent was never addressed or 
brought before Judge Murphy and, therefore, there can be no 
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reversal of a judgment by Judge Moffat because there was no 
judgment ever entered to be reversed. 
Respondent's do not refute the law cited by Appellants which 
states that one District Court Judge cannot reverse the ruling of 
a co-equal District Court Judge. Nor does the Respondent refute 
the proposition that litigants should not be allowed to forum 
shop and to bring their grievances between co-equal judges in an 
effort to obtain a favorable ruling. However, the proposition 
with regard to one District Court Judge over-ruling another is 
not the case nor the question presented by these proceedings. 
As stated in the definition of reversal as cited in Atlantic 
Coastline Supra, there must first have been a judgment to 
reverse. Certainly all parties would agree that at the time 
Respondent brought her Motion to set aside the consent the only 
appropriate forum was to bring the matter in District Court. It 
would have been inappropriate at that time for Respondent to 
have brought the Motion in the Court of Appeals which would, in 
essence, have be required if one was to take Petitioners' claim 
to its logical conclusion. In other words, in order for 
Appellants to support the allegation that Judge Moffat's decision 
was reversing a co-equal judge would mean that Judge Murphy would 
have had to have previously considered the Motion and had ruled 
on the matter and, therefore, the appropriate forum would be for 
Respondents to go directly to the Court of Appeals. Certainly 
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those are not the facts nor law and, consequently, no reversal 
was made between two District Court Judges. 
By analogy, when one looks at any other form of 60(b) 
motion, it is well accepted and established that it is not 
necessary for the same judge who hears the 60(b) motion also be 
the judge who actually rendered the judgment. Further no one 
would argue that in the event an alternative judge set aside the 
judgment pursuant to 60(b) that that decision was a reversal of 
the decision entered by the judge who rendered the judgment 
sought to be set aside. 
In Appellants' brief, they contend that if a different judge 
hears the motion to set aside the consent as opposed to the judge 
who took the consent that the ruling by the judge on the motion 
to set aside would constitute a reversal of a co-equal judge. 
Appellants, however, cite no case law that those circumstances 
would constitute a reversal. Although Respondent has been unable 
to find case law in which a court of review has addressed the 
particular issue, there are several cases in which a different 
judge has heard the motion to set aside the consent as opposed to 
the original judge hearing the motion. 
On March 13, 1969, Respondent filed a petition and 
motion with the Court to have the consent to adoption 
set aside and vacated and the care, custody and 
control of the infant restored to her. She claimed, 
at the time she signed the consent, that she was not 
aware of the nature and consequences of the act and 
was acting under undue influence, coercion and 
mistake. 
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The motion was heard by another judge who found 
Respondent knew and understood what was taking place 
when she signed the consent 
In Re Adoption of K 465 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970). 
When one reads the statute pertinent to the obtaining of a 
consent for adoption, it is apparent that it is not necessary for 
a judge to even make a ruling as to the validity of the consent. 
. Provided, that if a person whose consent is 
necessary is not within the county, the Court may, in 
the same manner as is or may be provided for the 
taking of depositions in civil cases, appoint a 
commissioner to examine such person upon his 
deposition and to take his written consent and to 
certify the same to the Court. The Commissioner shall 
explain to such person the legal significance of such 
consent, and shall certify to the Court his findings 
as to whether or not the consent is freely given. 
Where such person is within the State of Utah, the 
commissioner shall issue to the judge of the District 
Court of the county in which such person is located. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As set out in statute, the Court may appoint a commissioner 
who obtains the consent and to explain the consequences of 
signing said consent and then as per the statute, the 
commissioner is the one who certifies to the Court that the 
consent was freely given. If one were to follow the position of 
Appellants under those circumstances who would hear the motion to 
set aside the commissioner or a district judge. See also In the 
Matter of the Adoption of F, 488 P.2d 130 (Utah 1971). 
-20-
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ALLOWED RESPONDENT TO REVOKE 
HER CONESENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD ON THE BASIS 
THAT SHE HAD BEEN INFORMED AND BELIEVED THAT SHE HAD 
SIX MONTHS TO CHANGE HER MIND AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR RESPONDENT TO ARGUE HER MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE 
A. The District Court appropriately set aside the consent 
on the basis that the consent was not knowingly and 
unconditionally given. 
Appellants contend that once a consent is obtained that the 
Trial Court conunits reversible error if after the child has been 
placed with adoptive parents the Court allows a party to revoke 
the consent without finding that the consent was obtained through 
fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. (See page 21 of 
Appellants' Brief.) As authority for Appellants1 position, they 
cite In re Adoption of K. 465 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1970). This 
characterization of the law is incorrect and inconsistent with 
the more compelling weight of the case law. 
The Supreme Court In the matter of S. 572 P. 2d 1371, 1374 
Utah 1977) which was decided subsequent to In re Adoption K. and 
which is cited by Appellants specifically states that a consent 
can be set aside if it is shown that the consent was "induced 
through duress, undue influence, or under some misrepresentation 
or deception; or other grounds which would justify release from 
the obligations of any contract." (Emphasis added Id.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held in P.P. vs. Social 
Services and Child W. Dept. 431 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah 1967): 
-21-
• The important phrase of the case is that it 
recognized the right of a natural mother to revoke 
written consent, and, as pointed out, when the 
question of undue influence is an issue f the Court 
should carefully scrutinize the evidence lest an 
honest, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be 
unjustly deprived of her child.1 Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held: 
The mother of a illegitimate child has the right both 
to its custody and to relinquish that right if for any 
reason she so desires. If she so decides and freely 
and voluntarily signs a release and consent for 
adoption, it is binding the same as any other 
contract. It is, of course, true that if no rights or 
interests of third parties have intervened, the Courts 
are quite liberal in permitting the withdrawal of such 
consent. 
In Re Adoption of F. 488 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971). 
Adjacent jurisdictions are also persuasive in setting out 
the appropriate standard with regard to the revocation of a 
consent for adoption. The Washington Court of Appeals has held: 
The ultimate question is whether the result was 
produced by means that seriously impaired the free and 
competent exercise of judgment. Such factors as the 
unfairness of the resulting bargain, the 
unavailability of independent advice, and the 
susceptibility of the person persuaded are 
.circumstances to be taken into account in determining 
whether there was unfair persuasion. 
In the Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 641, 181 (Wash. 
App. 1982). 
As set out by the Washington Court of Appeals it is 
appropriate to set aside a consent based on factors such as the 
inavailability of independent advice, susceptibility of the 
person persuaded and the unfairness of the resulting bargain, all 
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of which are factors which do not rise to the level of fraud or 
misrepresentation. When Appellants contend that the only basis 
for setting aside the consent is fraud, undue influence or 
misrepresentation, they mischaracterize the applicable case law. 
When one applies the standard as set out above to the facts 
of this case, it is apparent that Judge Moffat's ruling setting 
aside the consent was appropriate. At the time the consent was 
obtained, less than 30 hours had transpired since the natural 
mother had given birth to her child. As set out in the 
transcript attached as Addendum "A", in which counsel for the 
natural mother proffered testimony as follows: 
That this is the basis of her understanding. She was 
told by the councilor that the adoption could not 
become final for six months; and although she had 
given her consent, which she understood was binding at 
that time, she also understood and thought that she 
had a right, during that six months to contest the 
consent; and, therefore, the ambiguity or 
misunderstanding is created as to the relationship 
between the six month waiting period that is required 
for adoptions in the State of Utah and her right to 
revoke that consent during the same six month period 
of time. 
She was under the assumption that she had the right 
that when she called up on Saturday, two days after 
she signed the consent, that she wanted the child back 
and that it was appropriate to do so. 
(Addendum "A".) 
Judge Moffat was also impressed as set out in the Minute 
Entry attached as Addendum "G" that the natural mother had not 
been counseled by any one other than Susan Bagley prior to the 
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time she offered the consent. 
In addition, the record established at the time the consent 
was given which is contained on paragraph 3 lines 11, 12, and 13, 
of Addendum of "B", the Court said: 
Do you understand — for want of a better word -- the 
finality of this? That if it goes forward, that you 
relinquish all parental rights forever. (See 
Addendum "B".) 
The language "that if it goes forward" connotes that in fact the 
consent was not final at that time and that there would be a 
period of time before the consent would become final. 
Based upon those factors, Judge Moffat appropriately ruled 
that the natural mother did not voluntarily offer her consent. 
B. The evidence presented to Judge Moffat did not render 
the motion the functional equivalent of a motion for summary 
j udgment. 
The Petitioners in subsection (b) of Point II of their 
Argument states to the Court that Respondentf s motion to set 
aside the consent based upon affidavits rendered the preceding 
the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. 
The mere fact that there were conflicting affidavits does not 
render the motion the equivalent of a motion for summary 
judgment. The motion before the Court was a motion to set aside 
the consent of the natural mother. The standard in which a 
Court applies to a motion for summary judgment and the standard 
in which a Court applies to a motion to set aside are entirely 
different standards. The standard pertinent to a motion for 
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summary judgment is a determination of whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, A motion to set aside 
the consent seeks a determination by the Court as to whether the 
consent was given voluntarily and with knowledge of its finality. 
When the Court rules on a motion for summary judgment, the Court 
gives deference to the affidavits of the non-moving party and, in 
short, the Court is required to assume the facts set out in the 
non-moving party's affidavit as being true. In Hoibrook Company 
vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
the parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the 
evidence, neither is it to deny parties the right to a 
trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose 
is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense of 
trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be 
entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears, is the 
Court justified in refusing such a party the 
opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting 
to persuade the trier of fact to his view. Id. 
Conversely, when evidence was offered to Judge Moffat, he 
was ruling on the credibility of the affidavits and the oral 
argument and there was no assumption that the non-moving party's 
affidavits were true. 
When Appellants cite in their brief: 
It has long been established that a judge cannot 
summarily determine questions of fact on the basis of 
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conflicting affidavits. 
Appellants misconstrue the nature of the proceedings before 
Judge Moffat. It was not the contemplation of the natural mother 
or the judge that all that was necessary to defend against the 
motion to set aside was that the appellants merely offer 
conflicting affidavits. Judge Moffat was setting in the position 
similar to a trial judge in making a determination or judgment of 
any other case. He was considering the facts which were 
presented to him and the credibility of the evidence and based 
thereon entered a judgment. 
Appellants assert: 
Such a resolution directly violates the rule that a 
Court cannot make factual determinations based upon 
conflicting affidavits. (See pages 24 and 25 of 
Appellants1 Brief.) 
This assertion ignores the fundamental purpose of a judge whom 
every day makes factual determinations based upon conflicting 
testimony whether it is offered by affidavit or otherwise. 
Appellants also contend that the only evidence presented to 
Judge Moffat was contained in the affidavits submitted to him. 
As set out in the transcript of the August 31, 1987, hearing, 
evidence was also offered by counsel as to the circumstances 
surrounding the consent. By analogy, other motions do not 
require the Court to have an evidentiary hearing. For example, 
motions for new trials or motions to set aside default, motions 
in limine and motions to dismiss and the like do not require an 
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evidentiary hearing but the facts warranting a grant or denial of 
said motions are offered by counsel based upon proffered 
testimony and the record before the Court. Respondent will not 
reiterate its prior argument with regard to waivers except to 
state to the Court that counsel for Appellants had several 
opportunities to request an evidentiary hearing and not at one 
time prior to the rendering of an adverse decision did Appellants 
ever request or contend that an evidentiary hearing was 
necessary. In fact, Appellants participated in the hearing on 
the motion to set aside the consent and offered oral argument in 
defense of the motion and only after Judge Moffat rendered his 
decision did Appellants contend that an evidentiary hearing 
should have been held. Consequently, as set out in Judge 
Moffat's Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F", Appellants have 
waived their right, if any, to an evidentiary hearing and should 
be estopped from setting back and waiting for a decision on the 
matter and only then making an objection. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing points and authorities, 
Respondent hereby respectfully submits to this Court that the 
judgment rendered by Judge Moffat was appropriate and, 
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consequently, this Court should affirm the setting aside of 
Respondent's consent and petitioner's petition for adoption. 
DATED this _2£ day of May, 1988. 
*^2^^^*^^ <A^ 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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WHEREUPON the following proceedings took place in 
chambers. 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of, title in the 
2
 file, adoption of infant anonymous. It's number A87-229 
3
 I This is the Motion of Tonya Marie Williams, to set 
aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree in this matter;an< 
I take it those refer to the Findings of Facts and Conclu-
sions of Law and the Decree of Adoption? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
8
 | THE COURT: That I would take it, that would also 
mean that we're here to consider the question of the irre-
10 I -vocation of the natural mother's consent to the adoption? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. It's your Petition, so I 
suppose you have the burden. You may proceed. 
14
 J MR. JOHNSON: Judge, I think that the standard tha 
"
 !
 applies to this case has been briefed by both sides and 
16 there are, however, a couple of highlights that I would 
like to bring to the Court's attention. 
The natural mother in this case is twenty-one yean 
of age. This was a first pregnancy. Was living at home 
at the time, working on and off. Apparently she did not 
show, and therefore, the fact that she was pregnant was a 
mystery with those around her, particularly her mother an 
" others wijth whom she associated. She had talked to some 
J persons early on;but the first real contact with the 
adoption agencies was around the first of June. The baby 25 
was born in the latter part of June. At that time 
because persons in the household don't know about it, in 
essence, she has got a chance to get through this without 
anybody knowing it, she contacts these people, in essence 
arranges to give the child up for adoption. 
Contrary to how the affidavit sounds, as I underst 
there was only one time after June 5th, that everyone 
meeting together and that was in the lawyer's office. 
After that date, she gave birth to the child on a Tuesday 
and was in Court on a Wednesday. And the birth was in th« 
early morning;and because consent was given a little late: 
about thirty hours later. 
Now, it is the contention of the mother, that just 
as stated in the affidavit. On the Saturday after the 
consent was taken on a Wednesday or Thursday;on that 
Saturday, she called a counselor up and said,"I want the 
baby back," and said, " I had a chance to think about this 
and I want the baby." And the counselor told her she wou] 
have to talk to her. Come in the office and talk to her. 
And that's the general arrangment. 
Now, the thing that we're relying upon, Judge, is-
the misunderstanding that the mother had. I think counsel 
after reading the transcript, accurately stated what the 
transcript said;Judge Young said something, N Do you 
understand that when you sign this consent that you're 
1 giving up rights forever? M And she says something 
2 to the effect, she understood that. And then the Judge 
3 asked the question again and she's^cut off in her response 
4 But this is the basis of her misunderstanding. She 
5 was told by the counselor that the adoption could not 
6 become final for six months;and although she had given hex 
7 consent, which she understood was binding at that time,she 
8 also understood and thought that she had a right, during 
9 that six months to contest the consent;and therefore, the 
10 ambiguity or misunderstanding is created as to the reldtit 
11 -ship between the six months waiting period that is requi-
12 -red for adoptions in the State of Utah and her right to 
13 revoke that consent during that same six months period of 
14 time. 
15 She was under the assumption that she had that rig 
16 that when she called up on Saturday, two days after she 
17 signed the consent, that she wanted the child back. And 
18 that it was appropriate to do so. Her explanation to the 
19 Court, she comes before this Court knowing this isfan 
20 inconvenience to everybody and not an easy thing for the 
21 adoptive parents and not an easy thing for the lawyers or 
22 for the Court involved. 
23 But she wants,more than anything in the world, to 
24 have this child restored to her. She believes that when 
25 she went to the adoptions agency that she was acting 
immaturely. That she thought that this was a 
period of time in her life she would be able to avoid b 
giving up the child for adoption. And when she saw what 
the reaction of the family was, that they were supportiv 
and they were willing to stand by her;and that she wante 
to have the child with her. 
Now, I don't think there is any misunderstanding 
to the drugs she's on. And in her affidavit says she i 
on pain medication. The record reveals that she was on 
Tylenol 3, with codeine. The doctor's affidavit says th 
it shouldn't affect her ability to make a knowing choice 
I leave that to the Court, coupled with the stress eleme 
that she was going through;and in essence, going through 
a birth without a father, and without the natural family 
aroiiftd her to support her. 
Now, Judge, the legal test to be applied in tie ca 
has beenstatedsseveral times, and it is to that point th 
I would like to address a couple of comments. The Court 
has indicated, in three or four cases which we have cit« 
that the Court should allow the setting aside of consent 
with liberality unless the rights of third parties have 
intervened;and there has been kind of a reliance upon 
that. My point, and I think what has been misstated in 
the briefs is, that hiring a lawyer, the appearance in 
Court are all expenses, if Tonya would have said No?» I^ < 
1 not going to sign the consent ;the only reliance that 
2 there is# is that which comes after the consent was signed 
3 And that is the difference between June 24th# the time she 
4 can raise some money,to get a lawyer and file the motion, 
5 which was filed timely. 
6 Now, there are several cases, and I think the timing 
7 is important. One of the key cases cited by everyone is 
8 In The Matter Of S. And that case which is a 1977 case, 
9 there was about a three months delay. In fact, I think 
10 just short of the three month period under Rule 60-B, by 
11 just a couple of days. 
12 One of the other key cases was one where there was 
13 almost an eight months delay in time;and I think this case 
14 where you have a natural mother, who comes in within two 
15 days of the time that she gave her consent, says, Ok. I 
16 would like to revoke it. Like the child back and then goei 
17 about trying to raise some money to get a lawyer;gets a 
18 lawyer and has the papers filed and a prompt motion. That 
19 is, it's appropriate under those circumstances. I don't 
20 think the adoptive parents could argue any bonding or long 
21 term relationship with this child;and of course, as expres 
22 -sed by all of the cases, the right of the natural mother 
23 is paramount to the extent, that there have been costs 
24 incurred that this Court feels are appropriate to be 
25 reimbursed my client and is willing to do that. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me go back and 
ask you a question now. What you're saying to me, in 
effect, is that we should look at the question of whethei 
or not, in the language of the case you've cited to me. 
In Re: Adoption of S. That we should look as of the 
time that she called and wanted to revoke her consent tc 
determine whether or not the rights or interests of thir 
parties have intervened? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. That's right. 
10 I THE COURT: Not as of today. You wouldn't deny 
11 that as of today, the rights and interests of third 
12 parties have intervened. 
13 MR. JOHNSON: I would think that's right. 
14 THE COURT: Go down the road as far as.an adoptio 
15 MR. JOHNSON: But, on the other hand, You know if 
16 we filed a motion I think the last of July, so I think 
17 about thirty days afterwards we filed the motions and we 
18 set the argument before Your Honor within I guess I coul< 
19 THECDURT: I can find it. Go ahead. Didn't mean 
20 to interrupt you. I thought I would understand your 
21 position . 
22 MR. JOHNSON: That has to be our position. No 
23 Question that the adoptive parents have, in essence, had 
24 from the end of June to now, almost two months with that 
25 child. But it is our contention that two months coupled 
1 with the timely filing of the consent and the social 
2 worker is saying, well, you're going to have to come down 
3 here or whatever. She gets a lawyer and just takes that 
4 long to file it, Judge. This is a motion that my client 
5 has not filed simply because of some whim. She wants that 
6 child more than anything in the world and she feels that i: 
7 the Court understands that she bore the burden of this 
8 pregnancy without anyone around her knowing of it, just I 
9 guess escaping on a day to day basis of not anyone knowing 
10 that coupled with the stress of birth that she had;and 
11 having somebody's shoulder to cry on in the form of the 
12 counselor. It gets her to the point of that upon adoption 
13 with a supportive family looking at this I think it's 
14 appropriate if she wants a right to have that child. And 
15 most importantly, I think that ihhterently, this six months 
16 ruling is one that is ambiguous. It's one I think we all 
17 have to sit and talk about. We understand that if that 
18 consent is given and a layperson is told "an adoption does 
19 not become final for six months;and whether the counselor 
20 or my client perceived it the way she did, her understand: 
21 is, that until that adoption becomes final, that during tl 
22 period of six months she had a right to reassert her righl 
23 to that child. That the determination was bidding when si 
24 gave it; during that six months period of time*she had th< 
25 right to revoke it. And I think that is sufficient under 
the case law that we citef to warrant the Court 
allowing the withdrawal of the consent and setting asid< 
of the Findings and Conclusions of the Decree of Adoptic 
4
 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. J0hnson. Mr. Haslam\ 
5
 MR. HASIAM: Your Honor,I think that I agree 
6
 generally, with the legal propositions presented by Mr. 
7
 Johnson. The cases thatf we both have cited are essenti 
8
 the same cases;and that is In Re: S. I think the most 
9
 important factor here today, Your Honor, is not the cone 
1° of revocation or timely revocation. 
" Mr. Johnson would appear to lead the Courtto belie 
*
2
 that revocation is something that can be done in cases c 
*
3
 this nature, much as a revocation of acceptance can be d 
14 under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code;if you 
,5
 it timely, then it's okay. That's not the case, in an 
*
6
 adoption especially, where other rights have intervened. 
17
 In this case, the transcript of the hearing before 
*
8
 Judge Murphy, which is in the Court's file. 
*
9
 THE COURT: I read it. 
20
 MR. HASIAM: The Court specifically asked the ke 
2
* question: Was she under the influence of any drugs and 
22




 The law that we have cited in our Memorandum indical 
2
* that there is a presumption of regularity to Court 
1 proceedings and that's why a judge signs and witnesse 
2 this consent. It's not acceptable for the Court Clerk to 
3 1 do it and not acceptable for a Notary to do it. It has to 
4 be by a judge;one of the very few people in the entire 
5 State of Utah that can witness an adoption. It's a very 
6 important proceeding. 
7 Ms. Williams had the opportunity to spend approximate 
8 twelve and a half hours counseling with the counselor at 
9 the Utah Women's Health Center;and that was from March 31* 
10 until the birth of the baby, which was June 23rd. That's 
11 more than two months, Your Honor. 
12 The affidavit of the counselor indicates that she di< 
13 not attempt to persuade this young woman as to what kind 
14 alternative was best to her. And that she presented it i 
15 a neutral fashion. The consent was given over thirty hou 
16 after delivery. And you'll note in the transcript of the 
17 proceedings. Judge Murphy specifically asked this natural 
18 mother if she had seen the baby and she said yes. I have 
19 seen the baby;and she, even after that, she came in and 
20 executed the consent before the Court. 
21 In this instance, it is the moving party who has the 
22 burden of proving fraud, duress or coercion. The Court i 
23 knows that it's a terrific burden. Not sure that the 
24 cases before the Court indicate that it has to be proved 
25 to a very, very high level. But fraud is a nasty claim. 
Duress is a nasty claim and coercion is a nasty claim 
This woman went to a third party, a professional 
counselor for help. She chose to not confide in her parenl 
Your Honor. She also went to a physician, who was licensee 
She1 *^ an?'otoacl^ tir!i^ ian.The obstetrician did not hotice*>?ny 
reluctance on this young woman1s part. 
Under the question of reliance,Your Honor, I can 
represent to the Court and the Court's file will indicate, 
that an order issued at the time the consent was signed, 
placing custody with my client, who have since that time, 
or a few hours thereafter, accepted this child from the 
hospital into their own home. 
Theyfve paid all the medical bills, all of the legal 
bills, all of the social workers1 bills that have been 
invdlved. At this time, I don't believe there has been a 
case made out of fraud on anybody's part or duress. This 
woman was not talked into it by anybody and there is no 
evidence of any coercion on anybody's pairt. This woman 
came to our office seeking assistance in placing the child 
Not as though we had temcajdling her for some period of 
time and submit it on that basis, Your Honor. 
MR. JOHNSON: Two quick comments. The cases that 
are cited, do not leave it with fraud. The matter, as I 
stated in my brief, no question it says that if the rights 
or interests of third parties have not intervened the Court 
1 
1 liberally permit withdrawal of such consent. It is 
2 otherwise where adoptive parents in reliance and good faitl 
3 have exerted efforts and expense anchform emotional attach-) 
4 -ments, based upon the consent of the natural mother. In 
5 this case, if the lawyer and the social worker convey to 
6 the adoptive parents the filing of the motions, which I 
7 assume that they did;and timely advised these people that 
8 the natural mother had some problems. It has only been 2 
9 months. 
10 In Re: The Adoption of K ., the 1970 case, the 
11 Court indicated, for good cause shown the Court ought to 
12 consider carefully the welfare of the child. And I think 
13 that those indicate that the test is not one of fraud, it*! 
14 one where this Court can look at the circumstances. 
15 It is always surprising to me in analysing things. 
16 Case Rule 60-B allows this Court to set aside a Judgment •• 
17 within three montns and for 60-B-l, for showing of excusa 
18 -ble neglect, good cause showing and that type of thing 
19 that relates to money judgments and those types of things. 
20 Now, in this case, it would appear to me, that whei 
21 the natural mother, who has her life with a young baby wit 
22 whom she wants a relationship pending;where there is an 
23 honest ambiguity as to what the meaning of the consent is; 
24 that it is appropriate to allow the setting aside of that 
25 decree'fcr good cause shown. 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, so that I understand you 
position. Would you, in this case, feel that the consent 
could have been revoked for whatever reason;that is, that 
the mother has an absolute right to revoke her consent at 
any time? 
MR. JOHNSON: I don't Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, let's not say at any time. Sa 
at any time within the first six months? 
MR. JOHNSON: I don't think so. I think there—tl 
case law says that the consent has a degree of regularity 
attached to it. I think that's the law. But in this 
case, I think you have to take each case as'.it goes. 
We've got a young mother who comes through a very 
stressfull pregnancy, no one knowing;and honestly, Judge, 
I really think this six months issue is a problem.. I thir 
it is easy for lawyers and judges after you've been throuc 
it to understand. But when you tell-the social worker 
tells her or she tells somebody elfte, that, Look, doesn't 
become final for six months. It's easy I think, for a 
natural mother to say, Ok. Then I have six months. It 
isn't final yet;and that is the first thing that my client] 
indicated to me when she came to the office and tried to 
talk to her about what it meant;and I think that that 
ought to be an appropriate basis. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess what you.fte saying to mel 
1 
1 is, assuming we don't have the problem of ."intervening 
2 rights or interest; that the natural'mot her .'ban revoke.her 
3 consent at any time for whatever reason is satisfactory to 
4 herself. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: Or satisfactory to the Court? 
6 THE COURT: Allright. And what I have to do then 
7 is believe that her revocation, believe that her understand 
8 -ing, the finality being six months down the road, instead 
9 of the time she gave her consent, is clearly different thai 
10 what she has said at the time the consent was taken, becaus 
11 it—you just have to read it, but— 
12 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: "Q. Why is it that you think it's in 
14 the best interest of the child that you relinquish any 
15 rights you have and consent to the adoption? 
16 I A. I just cannot take care of her financially. 
17 Q. Do you understand—for want of a better word— 
18 the finality of this? That if it goes forward, that you 
19 relinquish all parental rights forever. 
20 A. Yes, I do. 
21 Q. And you are doing this freely and voluntarily. 
22 A. Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
23 Q. No one has forced you to do this. 
24 A. Nobody has. It's my own decision. 
25 Q. Did you see that child after the child was b03 
A. Not;*after she was bornf but I did later that 
day. I've been down there three times. 
Q. Did you make up your mind to relinquish your 
parental rights after you had seen the child? 
A. What do you mean? 5; v^e decided all along to 
have this adoption go through, and I know that there will 
not be any rights for me to— M Then of course trailed off 
and the Court made another statement. 
MR. JOHNSON: Suggest one reading to the Court. 
If you look at that question," Do you understand—for want 
of a better word—the finality of this? That if it goes 
forward, that you relinquish all parental rights forever.11 
So she is thinking— 
THE COURT: Six months down the road. 
MR. JOHNSON: Down here, this is the—in my mind 
the key statement on line 21 on page 3:MQ. Did you make u 
your mind to relinquish your parental rights after you had 
seen the child? A. What do you mean? I've decided all 
along to have this adoption go through, and I know that 
there will not be any rights for me to—"and I think 
counsel, who is there, I cettainly was not there. In the 
brief it is said that she was cut off or she trailed off, 
trying to form a thought and the Court just proceeded. Bu 
I think that reading is consistent with her proposition 
that, Gee, I understood that if the six months goes by,the 
1 
1 adoption is granted. It's done. And I could 
2 represent to the Court that was the first thing she 
3 indicated to me?that she thought that she had been misled 
4 into thinking that she had that time, because, otherwise, 
5 it's strange for her to call up on Saturday, which in the 
6 affidavit of the social worker, she acknowledges, and 
7 says, " I want my child back." But; that's all we've got 
8 Judge. 
9 THE COURT: A strange thought just struck my mine 
10 and that is, I really shouldrift be hearing this. The guj 
11 who ought to hear it is Judge Murphy. He is the one that 
12 took the consentrand in effect, I would be, in effect, if 
13 I rule in your favor, I will be overruling to a certain 
14 extent, on a fellow judge. But really, he took the 
15 consent. May be he ought to hear this. 
16 MR. HASIAM: We presented that to Mr. Burgi, and 
17 Mr. Burgi suggested that I bring that to you. 
IS THE COURT: Well, not sure I agree with Don in tha 
19 case. Tell, you what I'll do. I am not afraid to make a 
20 decision. But I do think I ought to talk to Judge Murphy 
21 to see whether or not he wants to make the decision. 
22 MR. JOHNSON: Allright, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: And I want to look at a couple of cas« 
24 I'll takfe the matter under advisement and advise you todaj 
25 If you're going back to Provo, I'll call your office. I'] 
advise you today, either my decision in the case or 
whether or not I think it should go back to Judge Murphy 
If I can reach Murphy today, and if I can't reach him,it 
will Ijave to be tommorrow* Either way, we111 get the ma 
taken care of* 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that 
on August 31st, 1987, I appeared before the above-named 
Court and reported in Stenotype the proceeding matters 
contained in the 17 pages of transcription herein and that 
the same is a true and correct rendering of my shorthand 
notes as reported by me. 
H.M. Walton C.S.R, 
Dated: May 6, 1988 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
Case No. A-87-229 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
INFANT ANONYMOUS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of June, 
1987, the above-entitled action came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge 
9 I in the Third Judicial District for the State of Utah, 
and was reported by me, Gayle B. Campbell, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah. 

















For Petitioners: Lincoln W. Hobbs 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
F1LEO iNCL-
Sa',*'-:--
AUG -7 1987 
GAYLE a. CAMpeeu • 
CfariHE.O ZHORIHAUO i3E?ORTE» 
. V U r U * € CITY. UTAH 
•"Yl/tf rfl'Vp 
Salt Lake City, Utah June 24, 1987 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of the adopti 
of Infant Anonymous, Case No. A-87-229. Lincoln Hobbs 
on behalf of the petitioners is present before the court, 
along with the natural mother. Mr. Hobbs, why don't you 
go head. Let's have the mother sworn in, and you put 
on what you believe is necessary. 
MR. HOBBS: I have brought before the court 
9 |] today who had an infant female born 
at the Holy Cross Hospital yesterday morning at about 
5:00 o'clock* or 4:19 a.m. She is before the court to 
give her consent to the adoption of her infant child, 
and I have met with her in the hall and provided her with 
a copy of the document which she will be signing, the 
affidavit relinquishing her paternal rights. She has 
read the same and she indicated to me she understands 
the same. If you would like to ask her any questions 
respecting the knowing consent on her behalf. 
THE COURT: Let me see your affidavit. 
MR. HOBBS: It's among these documents. 


















having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on 
her oath as follows: 
BY THE COURT: 
EXAMINATION 
Mr. Hobbs has indicated that 
2 
1 || you have read this affidavit. Is that true? 
2 f A Yes, I've read it. 
Q And you are 
A Yes. 
Q And you are the natural mother of the child 
in question, who was born on June 23, 1987. 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Why is it that you think it's in the best 
8 8 interest of the child that you relinquish any rights you 

















A I just cannot take care of her financially. 
Q Do you understand — for want of a better 
word — the finality of this? That if it goes forward, 
that you relinquich all parental rights forever. 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And you are doing this freely and voluntari 
A Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
Q No one has forced you to do this, 
A Nobody has. It's my own decision. 
Q Did you see that child after the child 
was born. 
A Not right after she was born, but I did 
later that day. I've been down there three times. 
Q Did you make up your mind to relinquish 
your parental rights after you had seen the child? 
A What do you mean? I've decided all along 
to have this adoption go through, and I know that there 
will not be any rights for me to — 
1 1 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hobbs, is there 
2 | anything that needs to be a matter of record and under 
3 I oath for the Order to be signed? 
MR. HOBBS: I would just have two matters 
I would want on the record. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOBBS: 
Q Are you under the influence of any drugs 
8 1 that may impair your ability to make a knowing consent 
9 I at this time? 
A No/ I'm not. 
MR. HOBBS: The other thing I would like 
on the record, I would like the record to reflect that 
I have brought a certificate of search for acknowledgment 
of paternity by the father. As of 9:01 a.m. this morning 
there have been no acknowledgment of paternity. 
15
 | THE COURT: All right. why 
16 I don't you go ahead and sign that affidavit. Fill in the 
17 I date f the 24th day of June, and sign it on the table there. 
(Document signed) 












THE WITNESS: Just for my stitches. 
THE COURT; All right. And that doesn't 
interfere with your ability to — 
23 II THE WITNESS: No, it doesn't. 




THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: All right. The affidavit having 
been signed, and having heard the testimony, it's appropriate 
that the Order as submitted be signed, and I'll do it 
at this time. All right. 
Good luck to you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
5 





State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, do hereby certify that 
I am a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah; 
That as such reporter, I attended the hearing 
7
 I of the foregoing matter and thereat reported in stenotype 
8 1 all of the testimony and proceedings had; that thereafter, 
g | my notes were transcribed into typewriting under my direction, 
and pages 1 through 5 constitute a full, true, and correct 
report of the same. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this, j?^ day 
of August, 1987. 
, .. GAYLE > B T C & M P B E L L , R . P . R 
14 H 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 












AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY 
Dennis V. Haslam (#1408) 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Sa]t Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Stilt Lake County Utah 
AUQ 241987 
H. Dixon Hind.'c>A£ter'< 3rd Oist. Court 
By _y^2^CZr^ "  
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY 
Case No. A-87-229 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Susan Bagley, having been duly sworn, does depose and 
state that: 
1. I am a counselor, employed by the Utah Women*s Health 
Center, with various responsibilities in counseling patients 
of the Center, including the counseling of pregnant women who 
have made a decision to place a child for adoption. 
2. 1 have a bachelor of science degree in Behavioral 
Science and liealth from the University of Utah, and am Assis-
tant Director of the Utah Women's Health Center. 
3. I have, in the medical records of my patient, 
, a signed and notarized Consent to Release of 
Personal and Medical Information which authorizes me to re-
V . » > - » N * 
lease to Winder & Haslam and to allow them to inspect and ob-
tain copies of any and all of "personal or medi-
cal records, bills, notes, x-rays and medical reports pertain-
ing to (her) phsyical or mental condition, past, present or 
future, upon a presentation of this consent or a photocopy 
thereof. " 
4. I first became acquainted with on or 
about March 31, 1987, when she came to the Utah Women's Health 
Center to determine the duration of her then-existing preg-
nancy, was at that time, and continues to be to 
the best of my knowledge, unmarried. She is 21 years of age. 
5. Following initial consultation with me 
at the Center, I met with and counseled her on several occa-
sions for a total of 12i hours respecting her decision to 
place her child for adoption. 
6. During the course of my counseling of , I 
did not advocate the option of adoption over any other of the 
alternatives available to her in her situation. 
7. During the course of my counseling of 
she continually affirmed that her desire respecting her preg-
nancy was to place her child for adoption, and that an adop-
tion would be in the best interests of her child, as she was 
unmarried and did not have the means to support the child. 
8. At no time during my counseling of iid 
she express any reservations respecting her decision to place 
-2-
the child for adoption, other than the natural and expected 
feelings of ambiguity in such a situation. 
9. After reached the final decision to 
place the child for adoption, we arranged an appointment and 
visited with Lincoln W. Hobbs, attorney for petitioners here-
in, and discussed the possibilities of a private adoption of 
her then unborn child- On or about June 5, 1987, at approxi-
mately 11:00 a.m., and I met with Mr. Hobbs at 
his office at the Jaw firm of Winder & Haslam. 
10. During that meeting, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs 
advised that: 
a. He would be paid by and acting as attorney for 
the petitioners herein, and as such could not provide any 
legal advice to He further advised her that 
should she have a legal question, she should direct the same 
to independent counsel, as he had an apparent conflict of in-
terest in advising her of her legal rights. 
b. He further told her that it would be necessary 
for her to visit with and sign a consent in the presence of a 
judge, and that following her signature on that consent, her 
rights to the infant would be terminated, and she could not 
thereafter change her mind and obtain custody of the child. 
11. Following that meeting, I had several other conversa-
tions with in which we discussed the finality of 
a decision she was to make respecting relinquishment of her 
child for adoption. 
-3- pnQO 
12. On June 22, 1987, I was notified that 
had gone into labor and was expected to deliver at Holy Cross 
Hospital, I met her at the hospital and sat with and assisted 
her through labor and delivery of her child, 
13. During a long labor, repeatedly stated 
her wishes to have the baby as soon as possible so she could 
return to her home and her "normal" lifestyle. During the 
labor, she waivered as to whether she wanted to know the sex 
of her child or whether she would want to see her child after 
its delivery. 
14. At no time during labor did she ever express any res-
ervations about her decision to place her child for adoption. 
15. On or about June 24, 1987, approximately 30 hours 
after the delivery of her child, and I met with 
Mr. Hobbs at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, prior to an appointed, scheduled meeting with 
Judge Michael R. Murphy of that Court, for the purpose of ob-
taining consent to the adoption and relinquish-
ment of her parental rights. 
16. At that time, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs provided 
with, for her inspection, a copy of an Affidavit 
Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption and 
asked her to review the same. 
17. In my presence, read the Affidavit. 
Following her reading of the Affidavit, Mr. Hobbs asked 
if she understood the contents of the document. 
stated she did. Mr- Hobbs told her that, in the 
presence of the judge, she would most likely be read a copy of 
the consent, asked if she understood the contents, asked if 
she understood her relinquishment would be a final decision, 
and would further be asked if she were under the influence of 
any drugs which might affect her ability to make a decision. 
18. Thereafter, Mr. Hobbs, and I proceeded 
to the chambers of Judge Michael R. Murphy, at which time, in 
the presence of a court reporter, signed the Af-
fidavit Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adop-
tion. 
19. Following the taking of consent in the 
judge's chambers, she and I went to lunch together in Salt 
Lake City. For approximately 2 hours we talked about her 
decision and about how she could now return to her normal ac-
tivities. During our lunch, she appeared in full control of 
all of her mental facilities, and did not appear to be unduly 
tired or affected by stress. 
20.. During the course of my counseling of 
she advised me she did not desire her mother, with whom she 
resided in Lindon, Utah, to know of her pregnancy. 
21. As a result of her request, and in light of the fact 
that I found her to be a mature, intelligent and sophisticated 
woman, I respected her decision and did not at any time allow 
-5- n(\1 
her mother to become aware of her pregnancy. 
22. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, 
mother was unaware of her daughter's pregnancy 
until several days following the delivery and 
return home. 
23. Several days after the consent was given, I was con-
tacted by who advised me she had spoken to her 
mother about the pregnancy and the adoption, and that her 
mother had expressed serious reservations about her daughter's 
desire and decision to place the child for adoption. 
then advised me she had "changed her mind" with re-
spect to the consent she had provided in the presence of Judge 
Michael R. Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County. 
24. Since that conversation with , I have had 
no further contact or communication with her. 
DATED this -/J l day of August, 1987. 
/ 
Susan Bagley 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /? *' d?/ of Au-
gust, 1987. ^
 r .-' 
NOTARY P U B L I C ^ 
My Commission Expires: Residing in Salt Lake County, UT 
/ 
1LUUJ-
-6- i-'S V. * v-' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, this day of August, 1987, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney for 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
AFFIDAVIT OF TONYA WILLIAMS 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
•riLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Selt Lake County Utafi 
JUL 22 1987 
U. Dixon Hindtey.C^ 3rd Dist. Court 
By — f & - jfeputy Clerk" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. f\ Vl~<P^\ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
, after first being duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the natural mother of the child involved in this 
matter. 
2. I signed the attached Affidavit relinquishing parental 
rights and consenting to adoption. 
3. At the time I signed that Affidavit, I had been on pain 
medication. Prior to going to the Court, I had significant doubts 
about giving the child up for adoption. I believe that the pain 
medication together with the stress that I was under because of 
childbirth simply left me without sufficient will and strength to 
properly evaluate that matter. 
4. After I left the hospital and got my strength back, I was 
resolute that I did not want to lose my child and wanted the 
rights to raise the child. I believe that had it not been for the 
medication and stress of childbirth, that I would have indicated 
to the persons involved that I did not want to give my child up 
for adoption. 
5. I do not have monies to fight this matter legally, and it 
took me the time from June 24, 1987 to to the time that I hired 
Richard Johnson to raise sufficient monies to be able to file the 
appropriate documents with the Court to request that the consent 
to set aside and that the Decree of Adoption be set aside. 
6. Aside from the medication and stress, I was informed and 
believed that the Decree of Adoption did not become final for six 
months and that I had that period of time in which some action 
could be taken. I do not understand that the giving of my consent 
and the signing of the Affidavit were the end of the matter and 
that there was in fact a period of time that could change my 
mind. 
7. I want very much to raise my child and have my parental 
rights restored. The child means everything to me and I would 
greatly appreciate the assistance of the Court in allowing me to 
have my rights with the child restored. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987. 
Movant 
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this day of 
, 198 . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: RESIDING AT: 
ooo« 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
-^v I hereb y certify that on the <^Q day of 
1987, I mailed a true andcorrect copy of 
the/forgoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V. Haslam 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 




MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
FILED «N CLERK 5 OFFICE 
Salt Lafce County Utah 
JUL 2 2i987 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF: 
Infant Anonymous. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND DECREE 
Case No. / f ^ V ^ ? 
COMES NOW and moves this Court pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an Order 
setting aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Adoption and allowing the movant, to 
withdraw her consent to the adoption. 
There is attached hereto and incorporated herein a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987. 
<£. 
1CHARD B. JOHNSO 
Attorney for Movant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the ^Q^L- day of 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the fori going, postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V. Haslam 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
(pAmeta ^UIMJWNIUJ 
1, r v - - * 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
r lLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lai;e County Utah 
JUL 2 2 1987 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF: 
Infant Anonymous, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Case Number: /j-ft^^A^? 
COMES NOW , by and through her attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson, and submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of ' Motion 
to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT .1 
THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY HAS 
JURISDICTION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF THE RELIEF SHE REQUESTS. 
In adoption cases the courts are given broad discretion to 
formulate a decree which is equitable and consistent with public 
policy. The Supreme Court of Utah in, 
D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547, 551 (1967), 
i\&jfJJt<* 
quoting prior case law said: 
. .the important phrase of the case is that it recognized 
the right of a natural mother to revoke written consent, and 
as pointed out, when the question of undue influence is an 
issue "the court should carefully scrutinize the evidence 
lest an honest, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be 
unjustly depraved of her child." 
Therefore, the courts not only have jurisdiction to hear the 
facts and make a decision, but the courts are also held to a high 
level of scrutiny to protect the rights of the natural mother to 
be with her child. 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated in 
In Re Adoption of F 488 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971): 
. .The mother of an illegitimate child has the right both 
to its custody and to relinquish that right if for any 
reason she so desires. If she so decides and freely and 
voluntarily signs a release and consent for adoption, it is 
binding the same as any other contract. It is, of course, 
true that if no rights or interests of third parties have 
intervened, the courts are quite liberal in permitting the 
withdrawal of such a consent. 
The fact that did not understand and 
freely and voluntarily consent to the adoption of her daughter 
along with the fact that petitioner forthwith moved the Court 




THERE ARE LEGAL GROUNDS WHICH JUSTIFY THE 
REVOCATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION. 
The standard for revocation of consent to adoption is set 
out in In the Matter of S., 572 p.2d 1370, 1374 (1977): 
A duly executed consent can be avoided only be showing the 
agreement was not entered into voluntarily but was induced 
through duress, undue influence, or under some 
misrepresentation or.deception; or other grounds which would 
justify release from the obligations of any contract. 
It seems quite clear that petitioner signed the consent from 
with the belief that she had six months before the adoption was 
final and during that period of time she could revoke her 
consent. The belief that consent was not final as of June 24, 
1987, was based on the representations and statements. When one 
applies the standard set out above, the consent agreement should 
be revoked based on the fact that there was a misrepresentation 
and the petitioner signed the agreement with the justifiable 
deception that she could regain custody of her daughter at any 
time within the next 6 months and while she was under the 
influence of pain medication. 
In addition to misrepresentation, the persons involved 
exercised undue influence. The essence of undue influence is 
-3-
unfair persuasion. See In Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 641, 181 
(Wash, App., 1982). 
The ultimate question is whether the result was produced by 
means that seriously impaired the free and competent 
exercise of judgment. Such factors as the unfairness of the 
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independant advice, 
and the susceptibility of the person persuaded are 
circumstances to be taken into account in determining 
whether there was unfair persuasion. 
1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 177, comment b at 491 
(1981) 
Certainly the petitioner's judgment, at the time she signed 
the consent, was impaired by the drugs taken and the 
representations that there was a six month period before the 
consent agreement was final. 
Additional light is shed on the issue by the court in 
In the Matter of Anderson, 589 P.2d 957 (Idaho, 1978). The 
standard the court applied in the case was whether the consent 
was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, and with full 
awareness of the legal consequences. Movant does not meet any of 
these requirements. She was relying on the misrepresentations of 
the effect at the consent. She was in no position to make a 
intelligent decision regarding the permanency of her consent. 
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Similar issues to the ones raised in this case were 
addressed by the Washington Court of Appeals in 
In Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178 (1982). The mother of an 
illigitimate child received aid from an agency. As a result of 
the advice of her physician and the agency she signed a consent 
agreement. The court further stated: 
During that time everyone advocated that she place her child 
for adoption. She was never clearly informed by the agency 
that even though it had spent money on her behalf, she was 
nonetheless free to retain her child and return to Michigan. 
She was not encouraged to consider alternatives and had no 
opportunity to reflect or seek independant advice. Although 
she was told the relinquishment was final, she was also 
improperly advised that another mother changed her mind 7 
months after relinquishment and recovered her child. 
.Additionally, she challenged her relinquishment 
immediately upon returning to Michigan. The findings further 
show this environment created in Miss. Perry's mind an 
obligation without option, to repay the agency's expenses by 
relinquishing her rights to the child. In view of these 
findings, the close relationship that must have developed 
and Miss Perry's dependancy upon the agency, we hold the 
court's conclusion must stand and the relinquishment be set 
aside. 
In light of the above case, petitioner should be allowed 
relief. In the Washington case as well as the case at issue the 
mothers were not fully informed by the agencies of their rights. 
Neither mother was encouraged to seek legal advice. Both mothers 
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were faced with outside pressures from their family. The agency 
lead both mothers to believe that there was a period of time 
after signing the consent that they could regain their children. 
Therefore, just as the consent was revoked in the case cited 
above so also should the petitioner be released from her consent. 
POINT III 
NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO REVOKE HER CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
The Supreme Court of Utah state in 
D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547 (1967): 
I take it that most everyone will agree that there is a 
strong presumption that a baby is better off with its 
natural mother; that such presumption must be overcome only 
by clear and convicting evidence; that even though a written 
consent is given her it is revocable under certain 
circumstances. 
. • .The ties by which a mother and child are bound together 
should not be severed except for grave and weighty reasons. 
The fact that this child may receive, at the hands of 
appellants, a better home that respondent can provide, is 
not sufficient reason for depraving her of her offspring. 
The natural affection which accompanies a child and her 
mother is a relationship which should be securely protected by 
the courts. Public policy dictates that children should not be 
severed from their mother unless it is the clear intention of the 
-6-
mother to do so. The court in the above cited case stated that 
even though the mother was destitute and had no means of 
providing for the child, and that the adoptive parents could more 
adequately give the child the necessities of life, there still 
existed insufficient grounds for awarding custody to the adopting 
parents. Id. at 552. 
CONCLUSION 
therefore respectfully requests the Court to 
revoke the consent agreement and allow her child to be returned 
to her. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987. 
'A, 
RICHARD B. JOHNSO 
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MINUTE ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1987 
Salt Lake County Utah 
SEP 25 1987 
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S^Wy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CASE NO, A-87-229 
The "Protective Motion for New Trial, Or, in the 
Alternative, Amendment from Judgment or Relief From Judgment" of 
the petitioners in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the Court on September 23, 1987. The Court heard 
argument, and has carefully examined the Memoranda and cases 
cited to it by counsel for both the petitioners and the natural 
mother, and now denies the above-described Motions. 
The reason for said denial is that while the matter should 
perhaps have initially been heard by the judge that took the 
consent, this Court discussed that matter with counsel for the 
parties at the time of the initial hearing herein, and neither 
party expressed a desire to have the judge who took the consent 
hear the matter. In addition, the matter was submitted on 
Affidavits and oral argument, without any request for the entry 
of additional evidence. It is the Court's opinion that had the 
parties asked either to have the original judge hear the matter, 
or have an evidentiary hearing, both of said motions would have 
been granted. However, having not done so, this Court is of the 
opinion that those matters have been waived. It has been urged 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
that the question of having the matter heard by the judge who 
took the original consent cannot be waived. However, this Court 
is of the opinion that is not a correct statement and that, in 
fact, such waiver did take place herein. Therefore, this Court 
rules as above set forth, and the provisions of the Minute Entry, 
dated September 1, 1987, will remain in full force and effect. 
The Court orders that the custody of the child be returned 
forthwith to the natural mother. The natural mother's attorney 
will prepare the Order. /T 
ATTEST 
h. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CASE NO. A-87-229 
The Court having considered the pleadings on file herein, 
together with the Affidavits and argument of counsel, hereby 
grants the Motion of to withdraw her consent 
to the adoption of her natural child known herein as Infant 
Anonymous, who was born June 23, 1987 at Holy Cross Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Court recognizes that any decision that it makes in this 
matter is going to be emotionally disturbing to one or the other 
of the parties herein. The Court is convinced, however, that a 
reading of the transcript of the proceedings at which the natural 
mother's consent was taken is not inconsistent and, in fact, 
implies that her consent is not final, and that the proceedings 
would have to "go forward." While the Court does not find fault 
with the judge that took the consent, when the language used 
therein at that time, jjt is considered in view of the allegations 
of the natural mother that she was told that the adoption would 
not become final for six months, which she took to mean that she 
could withdraw her consent at any time during that six month 
period, it becomes apparent that she probably did not knowingly 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
consent to the release of her parental rights on an unconditional 
basis. The language involved is found on lines 11, 12 and 13 of 
page 3, where the Court said, "Do you understand — for the want 
of a better word — the finality of this? That if it goes 
forward, that vou relinquish all parental rights forever," 
(Emphasis supplied)• 
The Court is further impressed by the fact that the natural 
mother did not consult with members of the family, including her 
own mother, until after the birth of the child, but was consulted 
only by a counselor at the Utah Women's Health Center• Again, 
not in any way to impune the capacity or capability of the said 
counselor, nevertheless, the natural mother, after consulting 
with her own mother, decided that she wanted her child back, and 
as evidence thereof, within three days after the consent had been 
taken (which was taken about 3 0 hours after the birth), she 
advised the counselor that she wanted the child back. She 
thereafter filed the Petition herein as soon as possible in view 
of her financial conditions, which was within 3 0 days of the date 
that she had given the consent• 
Under the circumstances, it is the Court's opinion that the 
mother did not freely and voluntarily given an unconditional 
release of her parental rights, that she was acting under a 
mistaken belief that the adoption would not become final for six 
months, and that she had the right to change her mind within that 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
six month period. The Court finds that if there was, in fact, 
less than a full, knowing, unconditional release of the parental 
rights, the equities in the matter weigh in favor of setting the 
consent aside, and the Court so orders. 
The Court further orders that custody of the child be 
returned forthwith to the natural mother. The natural mother is 
ordered to repay to the adoptive parents the reasonable costs 
they have incurred in this matter. She may have a period of two 
years to pay those costs in equal monthly installments. 
The natural mother's attorney will prepare the Order. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By ,K .QQ&^JLQ 
OepKity Clerk 
ADDENDUM "H" 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. A-87-229 
This matter having come on for hearing before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat on the 31st day of August, 1987. 
The natural mother was present and represented by her attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not present nor 
represented by their attorneys Lincoln W. Hobbs and Dennis V. 
Haslam. The natural mother having filed a Motion to Set Aside 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Adoption in this matter and to withdraw her Consent and the 
parties having submitted affidavits and memoranda in support of 
their position and having argued the matter before the Court 
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and submitting to the Court for decision based upon the 
memoranda and affidavits and in addition, having considered 
Petitioner's protective Motion for New Trial or in the 
alternative amendment from judgment or relief from judgment 
which came on for hearing before the Court on September 23, 
1987. The natural mother was again present and represented by 
her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not 
present but were represented by their attorney, David S. 
Dolowitz. The Court, having carefully examined the memoranda, 
affidavits and arguments presented by counsel and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that is in fact 
the natural mother of a minor child born out of wedlock on June 
23, 1987. 
2. The Court finds that on June 24, 1987, that the natural 
mother, appeared before Judge Michael R. 
Murphy and was questioned concerning the Consent. 
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3* The Court finds that the natural mother was not clearly 
apprised of the finality of signing the Consent. Specifically, 
the Court finds that the natural mother was confused and indeed 
believed that even though she signed the Consent, she would 
still have six months, during which time the Decree of 
Adoption, would not be final and at any time during that six 
month period she could withdraw her Consent. 
4. The Court finds that the natural mother did not 
knowingly consent to the release of her parental rights on an 
unconditional basis. 
5. The Court finds that the natural mother did not consult 
with members of her immediate family including her own mother 
until after the birth of the child and that the only 
consultation received by the natural mother was from a 
counselpr at .the UJbah Women's Health Center .^wc,^/u ,AT^^^£ £UV* 
' 6. The Court /finds txiat after the natural mother had 
consulted with her own mother that the natural mother decided 
she wanted her child back and within three days advised the 
counselor that she wished to withdraw her Consent. 
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7. The Court finds that a Petition to withdraw the natural 
mother's Consent was filed as soon as practical in view of her 
financial condition which was accomplished within 30 days of 
the date she had given consent. 
8. This Court finds in response to Petitioner's Protective 
Motion for New Trial or in the alternative Amendment from 
Judgment or Relief from Judgment that this Court discussed the 
matter of whether the case should be heard by Judge Murphy who 
originally took the Consent of the natural mother and finds 
that neither party expressed a desire to have Judge Murphy hear 
the matter. 
9. The Court finds that since neither party expressed the 
desire to have Judge Murphy preside that said parties waived 
that right. 
10. The Court finds that the Protective Motion for New 
Trial or in the alternative Amendment from Judgment or Relief 
from Judgment was submitted on affidavits and oral argument 
without any request for the entry of additional evidence and 
further finds that the parties waived their right to offer any 
additional evidence by neglecting to make said request. 
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11. The Court finds that the natural mother did not make 
an informed knowing unconditional release of her parental 
rights and is entitled to revoke her Consent* 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Consent to adoption is hereby set aside and the 
adoptive parents are ordered to return the minor child to the 
natural mother forthwith. 
2. The right to have Judge Murphy who took the original 
Consent preside over these proceedings has been waived by the 
parties to this action. 
3* The right to offer additional evidence relative to 
these proceedings has been waived by the parties by their 
failure to timely assort sai£ rfighy. 
DATED thj 
. el e n  s a i d ^ i g h V





H. DIXON HINDLEY 




hereby certify that on the 3*4 day of 
, 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
g ng, postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
P.O. Box 2668 
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ADDENDUM"!" 
ORDER OF STAY OF EXECUTION 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF ) 
THE ADOPTION OF: ) ORDER OF STAY 
) OF EXECUTION 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. ) Civil No. A8 7-2 29 
* * * * * * * * 
This court, having considered the application of the 
petitioners for a stay of execution of the Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court directing return of Infant Anonymous to 
the natural mother and the district court having refused to stay 
said order pending presentation of the issues in this case on 
appeal, this court now finds and concludes that a Stay of Execu-
tion should be entered by this court prohibiting enforcement of 
the order of the District Court requiring return of Infant Anony-
mous to the child's natural mother until this matter is fully 
considered by the court. 
Accordingly IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
Execution of the Order implementing the decision of the 
District Court of September 1, 1987, setting aside the 
F I L E D 
SEP 2 51387 
rel iquishment of the natural mother and d i r e c t i n g the return of 
Infant Anonymous to the natural mother i s hereby stayed u n t i l 
t h i s matter can be f u l l y considered by t h i s c o u r t . 
DATED t h i s J2<r day of c S ^ T S ^ / " / 1987. 




I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the 
following on this «2.f> day of September, 1987: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East £300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
DSD:090487F 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that ont he 25th day of September, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Stay was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
PO Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Richard B. Johnson 
Atttorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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ADDENDUM "J" 
ORDER REGARDING MODIFICATION OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
) ORDER REGARDING 
) MODIFICATION OF 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. A87-229 
) Judge Moffat 
* * * * * 
jj The above-entitled matter came before the court, the 
(Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, on Friday, the 5th day 
i 
IIof February, 1988, to consider the objections of the adoptive 
[parents to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
IIOrder and Judgment that had been accepted by the court and 
|ientered on December 3, 1987. Counsel for the natural mother 
agreed that Rule 2. 9 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah had not been followed 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS 
I in this matter and agreed that it was appropriate for the 
I court to consider the objections of the adoptive parents. The 
court then heard and considered the specific objections and 
|| ruled that the objection to Paragraph 1 of the Order and 
i| Judgment should be sustained, and, by interlineation, deleted 
j the language "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree 
of Adoption," and inserted the language "Order of Temporary 
i 
,' Custody filed and dated June 24, 1987," 
The court then considered the objections to the 
»• Findings of Fact and the court, examining the objection to the 
| proposed Finding of Fact No. 3, determined that, although the 
adoptive parents objected to proposed Findings of Fact No. 3 
!j on the grounds that there had been no trial and this could not 
ij 
I be determined as a question of fact, there were conflicting 
J affidavits, to-wit: those of Dr. Cynthia A. Jones and Susan 
jl Bagley, opposing the affidavit of the natural mother, and 
Judge Michael Murphy had made a determination directly 
il 
|| contrary to this determination, the ruling of the court 
!! necessarily encompassed this finding and it was appropriate. 
i! 
ji The objection was overruled. On the same basis, the court 
! overruled the objections of the adoptive parents to Findings 
|| of Fact, Paragraph 4, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 7 and Paragraph 
11. The court determined that the objection should be granted 
i 
|| in part as to Paragraph 5 and by interlineation at the end of 
'I 
the existing provision, the court added the language " . . . 
and the consultation set forth in the affidavit of Cynthia A. 
Jones, M. D. n 
The objections of the adoptive parents to Paragraphs 8, 
9 and 10 were withdrawn. 
Having thus ruled on the objections and by 
i1 interlineation made the corrections that the court deemed 
appropriate to make, the court now ratifies, and by means of 
this order, confirms its entry of the the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment as thus modified, 
as previously entered on December 3, 1987, to the extent that 
the objections of the petitioners are inconsistent with this 
ruling, they are overruled. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
T^^^^r^* rf />-
RICHARD B. JOHNSOl 
Attorney for Natural Mother 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILINO 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true copy of the above and foregoing Order, this 
day of , 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
-#-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the "Z< day of / ^ t ^ 
1988, I mailed a* true and correct cop#?sof the foregoing to the 
following, postage prepaid. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Julie A. Bryan 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^Z^lLjsl. ^// 
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